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1.  Introduction 
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) appears to enjoy 
a relatively wide freedom in procedural matters. The ICJ’s Statute does 
not contain detailed rules and the Court has considerable leeway in in-
terpreting them and, eventually, in filling the gaps. States parties to the 
Statute have few means at their disposal for exercising a direct control 
over the Court’s activity in this field. The procedure for amending the 
Statute is too cumbersome and does not represent a viable option;1 in-
deed, it has never been used. This means, incidentally, that a text that in 
largest part was drafted almost one century ago has been progressively 
adapted to meet changing contexts and new developments only through 
the interpretative activity of the Court. Moreover, unlike the case of other 
international tribunals,2 States parties play no role in the procedure for 
the adoption of the Rules of the Court; the Statute leaves entirely to the 
Court the task of adopting such Rules.3 
 
* Professor of International Law, University of Macerata. 
1 Art 69 of the Statute provides as follows: ‘Amendments to the present Statute shall 
be effected by the same procedure as is provided by the Charter of the United Nations 
for amendments to that Charter, subject however to any provisions which the General 
Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council may adopt concerning the 
participation of states which are parties to the present Statute but are not Members of the 
United Nations.’ 
2 For a general overview see Ch Brown, A Common Law of International Adjudication 
(OUP 2007) 38-40. 
3 See below para 2.2. 
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Commentators have long highlighted the freedom of action retained 
by the ICJ in procedural matters.4 Some of the tools available to the Court 
in this field – such as the recourse to general principles of procedural law 
or the assertion of inherent powers – has been extensively studied.5 Oth-
ers, such as the method used by the Court for the interpretation of its 
own Statute,6 still wait to be fully explored. It is evidently beyond the 
scope of the present article to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
many problems that may be raised when studying international proce-
dural law from the standpoint of the theory of international sources. I 
will focus on two issues: the processes regarding the creation of interna-
tional procedural rules and the instruments for their enforcement. Rather 
than attempting to directly answer the question of the special nature of 
rules of procedure governing the activity of the Court, the present study 
will address such question by following a different path. The perspective 
here adopted is that of an assessment of the Court’s powers in the crea-
tion and enforcement of its own procedural rules. 
I will first deal with the power of the Court to adopt rules of proce-
dure (2). My intention here is to assess the procedure followed in practice 
by the Court for the adoption of such rules, as well the different instru-
ments by which this regulatory power is exercised. I will then examine 
the ‘power of sanction’ of the Court (3), namely the ways and means by 
which the Court may sanction the parties of a dispute in case of a breach 
of a procedural rule or when a party attempts to exploit such rules to 
obstruct the administration of justice. By focusing on (international pro-
cedural) law-making and (international procedural) law-enforcement, 
 
4 See eg HWA Thirlway, ‘Procedural Law and the International Court of Justice’ in 
V Lowe, M Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice (OUP 1996) 
389, 405. 
5 On general principles of procedural law see R Kolb, ‘General Principles of 
Procedural Law’, in A Zimmermann, Ch Tams (eds), The Statute of the International 
Court of Justice: A Commentary (3rd edn, OUP 2019) 964; on the inherent power of 
international courts see Ch Brown, ‘Inherent Powers in International Adjudication’ in C 
P R Romano, K J Alter, Y Shany (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Adjudication (OUP 2014) 828. 
6 In its case law, the Court has addressed questions of interpretation of its Statute by 
explicitly applying the rules of interpretation codified in the Vienna Convention of the 
Law of Treaties. See eg LaGrand (Germany v United States of America) [2001] ICJ Rep 
501.  
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the aim is also to shed light on possible dynamics – relating to the rela-
tionship between the Court and States, both as prospective clients and as 
parties to a case – that may influence the activity of the Court, acting as a 
limitation to its general freedom in this field (4).  
 
 
2. International procedural law-making: A largely unrestrained power of 
the Court? 
 
2.1. The statutory power of the Court to adopt its own Rules 
 
Under Article 30(1) of the ICJ’s Statute, ‘[t]he Court shall frame rules 
for carrying out its functions. In particular, it shall lay down rules of pro-
cedure’. The Statute leaves the Court free to decide the procedure for the 
adoption of its rules of procedure. The main limitation, a substantive one, 
is not spelled out explicitly: rules of procedure have to conform to the 
Statute. Yet, as already noted, the Statute is far from providing an over-
detailed regulation. It leaves a considerable margin of flexibility to the 
Court. The perusal of the preparatory works shows that this was made 
on purpose. When the Advisory Committee of Jurists had addressed this 
issue, the president of the Committee, Baron Descamps, emphasized the 
need to leave some flexibility to the Court on procedural matters. Ac-
cording to him, ‘the Committee should not draw up the procedure of the 
Court in too much detail. The Court itself ought to formulate these rules 
in its internal regulations. The rules of procedure which ought to be sub-
mitted for the States’ approval must deal only with fundamental points’.7 
At the time of the drafting of the ICJ’s Statute, the Informal Inter-Allied 
Committee took a similar view, namely that ‘the procedure of the Court 
would best be left to be settled by the Court itself by Rules of the Court’.8 
Questions of non-conformity to the Statute of the rules adopted by 
the Court have been rarely raised. The most famous precedent is proba-
bly that concerning the formation of ad hoc chambers under Article 26(2) 
of the Statute. In this regard, the main criticism came from within the 
 
7 PCIJ, Procès-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists (Van 
Langenhuysen 1920) 248. 
8 For this citation, see HWA Thirlway, ‘Article 30’ in A Zimmermann, Ch Tams 
(eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (3rd edn, OUP 
2019) 590. 
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Court and was expressed by Judge Shahabuddeen in his powerful dis-
senting opinion in Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute.9 In a few 
cases, States party indirectly raised the question of conformity of a certain 
rule to the Statute in order to support a particular interpretation of that 
rule. Italy did this when, in Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya/Malta), it argued that, since Article 62 of the Statute did not 
require, as a condition for intervention, the existence of a jurisdictional 
link between the intervening State and the parties, Article 81(2)(c) of the 
Rules could not be interpreted as requiring such condition.10 Yet, despite 
some occasional criticism, the Court’s activity in this field has been 
largely perceived as unproblematic. Among commentators, while some 
have stressed ‘the great deal of latitude’ that the Court has permitted it-
self in exercising the rule-making power conferred by the Statute,11 oth-
ers have stressed its ‘excessive conservatism’.12 The overall impression, 
on balance, is that the Court has exercised a reasonable measure of re-
straint in interpreting its procedural power under the Statute. The 
Court’s restraint can be explained having regard primarily to the context 
in which it operates – a point to which I will revert later. While there is 
no effective mechanism for reviewing the validity of the procedural rules 
enacted by the Court, the Court’s lack of compulsory jurisdiction is a 
powerful deterrent against ‘creative’ solutions, particularly when these 
solutions may have the effect of restricting the parties’ control over the 
procedure. 
Rather than dealing with the content of procedural innovations 
brought about by the Court, however, it is on the processes governing 
the Court’s adoption of procedural rules and on the variety of pertinent 
instruments that the next paragraphs will focus. 
 
 
 
 
9 ICJ, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua 
intervening) [1990] ICJ Rep 55. 
10 ICJ, Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) (ICJ 
Pleadings, vol II, Oral Arguments, Documents 1980) 542. I am indebted to Makane 
Mbengue from drawing my attention on this precedent. 
11 HWA Thirlway, ‘Article 30’ (n 8) 405. 
12 Sh Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-2005 (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2006) 238. 
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 2.2.  The procedure for the adoption of the Rules: issues of transpar-
ency and participation 
 
As said before, the Statute does not regulate the procedure by which 
the Court adopts its Rules. It simply recognizes that the power to enact 
the Rules belongs to the Court. At the time of the 1972 and 1978 revisions 
of the Rules, the task of conducting the necessary preparatory works was 
assigned to an ad hoc committee composed of selected judges. Since 1979 
the Court has established a standing Rules Committee, which ‘advises the 
Court on procedural issues and working methods’.13 The reasons that 
lead the Court to start a process of revision may vary. When, in 1967, the 
Court decided to conduct a general revision of its Rules, it justified this 
initiative by referring to the fact that the Rules of 1946 no longer fully 
corresponded to the requirements of a modern international tribunal.14 
The point to be stressed here is that, as noted by Rosenne, the 1972 revi-
sion ‘was a spontaneous act on the part of the Court’, as there was ‘no 
clearly enunciated and widely backed political demand, based on a wide 
consensus, for any review of the Statute or of the Rules of the Court’.15 
More broadly, if one considers the practice so far followed by the present 
Court when revising its Rules, the most striking aspect is that the Court 
has constantly treated the matter as an exclusively ‘internal’ one. The 
Court has generally avoided to put in place mechanisms or procedures 
that would allow some form of external participation or control. By so 
doing, it seems to have maximized its freedom of maneuver in designing 
the rules governing its procedure and limited possible checks on judicial 
authority by States and other actors. Two aspects appear to be particu-
larly noteworthy. 
The first one concerns the role of States in the procedure for the 
Rules’ revision, in particular the possibility that States be given a say 
about the proposals put forward by the Court. While Article 30 of the 
Statute leaves to the Court the final decision as to whether and how to 
 
13 See <www.icj-cij.org/en/chambers-and-committees>. 
14 (1967-1968) ICJ YB 86. 
15 Sh Rosenne, Procedure in the International Court (Martinus Nijhoff 1983) 237-8, 
who also observed that ‘the revision of the Rules thus appears… not as meeting any clearly 
formulated objective set for it by the States which created it for their service, and to which 
it owes its continued existence’. 
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revise the Rules, it certainly does not preclude the possibility of establish-
ing a mechanism for consulting the States parties. In some circumstances, 
the Court has put in place informal mechanisms aimed at receiving ex-
ternal inputs, in particular from experienced authorities on the work of 
the Court. At the time of the 1972 revision, as reported by a judge,16 ‘for-
mer judges of the Court, former judges ad hoc, and those international 
lawyers who had pleaded at least three cases were asked for their opinions 
on the revision of the Rules of the Court’. In 2016, a seminar was held at 
the ICJ in order to encourage a discussion ‘between Members and staff 
of the Court, counsel, commentators and members of the diplomatic 
corps, as to how the Court should respond to the challenges it faces in 
the dynamic and increasingly populated landscape of international jus-
tice’; on that occasion, a number of proposals were made ‘for reform of 
the Court’s rules or procedures’.17 It is not clear what could be the impact 
of these initiatives on the work of the Court. In any case, their aim is to 
stimulate a general discussion on possible future revisions rather than to 
establish a consultation on specific proposals. 
It has been suggested that the Court should give notice of any pro-
posed new rules or revisions and allow States and other actors to present 
comments.18 No doubt, this proposal deserves consideration. By consult-
ing States the Court may have a better perception of the different needs 
and sensibilities of its prospective clients. However, there are also down-
sides, that may render any procedure of prior consultation or preliminary 
comments more troublesome than beneficial to the Court. If States are 
given the possibility to comment, the Court will inevitably be asked to 
take these comments into account. This may end up in a sort of negotia-
tion between the Court and States (or a group of States) that risks under-
mining the authority and the exclusive power of the Court in this field. 
The experience of other international tribunals, where the dialogue be-
tween the judicial body and States on the revision of the rules of proce-
dure has proved to be rather complex and where a highly politicized en-
 
16 E Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice’ (1972) 67 AJIL 1. 
17 J Crawford, A Keene, ‘Editorial’ (2016) 7 J Intl Dispute Settlement 225, 227. 
18 S Yee, ‘Notes on the International Court of Justice (Part 3): Rule-making at the 
Court - Integration, Uniformization, Keeping Existing Article Numbers and Giving 
Public Notice’ (2009) 8 Chinese J Intl L 681, 692. 
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vironment has rendered it difficult to reach a consensus over very tech-
nical issues,19 provides a warning against the risks associated with the 
opening up of the procedure to States. 
The other point concerns the transparency of the process leading to 
the adoption of new rules. Unlike the Permanent Court, the present 
Court has not made publicly available the records of meetings devoted to 
the revision of the Rules.20 The Court limits itself to provide few synthetic 
information about the reasons that led to the revision and its implica-
tions. Should the Court publish the minutes of the debates leading to the 
revision of the Rules? No doubt, confidentiality has some advantages. In 
principle, it should favour a more open and frank discussion among 
judges; in this respect, it therefore provides greater protection to judicial 
independence. It also hides possible divisions within the Court, thereby 
permitting to present the new rules as the result of a collegiate decision. 
On balance, however, greater transparency would be preferable.21 It 
stands as a mild and largely acceptable form of check on the Court’s ex-
ercise of its law-making function, as it allows States, practitioners and all 
those who have an interest in the work of the Court to better grasp the 
reasons which prompted a certain revision, as well as the interpretation 
of the Statute upon which the new rule relies. 
 
2.3.  Procedural soft law at the ICJ: Practice Directions 
 
Since 2001, in addition to the Rules, the Court has regulated the pro-
cedure before it through the adoption of Practice Directions. So far, the 
total number of them is 16. Neither the Statute nor the Rules mention 
this instrument. The power of the Court to adopt them can easily be jus-
tified by referring to the same legal basis which provides the Court with 
the power to adopt its Rules, namely Article 30 of the Statute.22 As to the 
 
19 See eg the case of the International Criminal Court. S Fernández de Gurmendi, 
‘Enhancing the Court’s Efficiency. From the Drafting of the Procedural Provisions by 
States to their Revision by Judges’ (2018) 16 J Intl Criminal Justice 341, 349. 
20 On this issue, see also HWA Thirlway, The International Court of Justice (OUP 
2016) 73 n 2. 
21 For this view, see also S Yee, ‘Notes on the International Court of Justice (Part 1): 
Arguments for the Publication of the Rule-making Materials’ (2008) 7 Chinese J Intl L 
691. 
22 HWA Thirlway, ‘Article 30’ (n 8) 593. 
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relationship between Rules and Practice Directions, the latter should not 
derogate from the former. When adopting a new Practice Direction, the 
Court constantly makes it clear that ‘Practice directions involve no alter-
ation to the Rules of Court, but are additional thereto’.23 
Practice Directions represent a remarkable development in the 
Court’s approach to procedural law-making. The Court has not ex-
plained why, instead of amending its Rules, it preferred to introduce a 
new set of procedural rules. This proliferation of governing texts is not 
uncommon before international tribunals. However, this phenomenon is 
frequently due to the fact that the different texts are adopted by different 
bodies24 or deal with partially distinct procedural issues. This is not the 
case here: it is the Court that adopts both the Rules and Practice Direc-
tions, and the two sets of rules cover substantially the same issues. 
A possible explanation may be found in practical reasons. The pro-
cedure for the adoption of Practice Directions appears to be less burden-
some and time-consuming than that for the revision of the Rules. In this 
respect, recourse to this instrument would respond essentially to a prac-
tical need to regulate matters of procedure in a less formal way.25 This 
aspect cannot be underestimated since nowadays the Court, because of 
its current workload, has less time at its disposal to dedicate to the revi-
sion of its Rules.26 
Yet, there seems to be another reason which may explain recourse to 
Practice Directions in order to regulate procedural issues. To capture this 
point, one has to focus on the different ways in which Rules and Practice 
Directions are formulated. Rules have generally a prescriptive content; 
they ask the parties to undertake a certain course of conduct. No doubt, 
there are elements of flexibility, in particular because of the importance 
which is frequently given to the agreement of the parties as a condition 
 
23 See eg  Press release No. 2013/6, <www.icj-cij.org/files/press-releases/6/ 
17296.pdf>.  However, according to HWA Thirlway, The International Court (n 20) 73, 
‘since the Rules and the Practice Directions are both made by the Court, if there were any 
inconsistency the Direction might be taken to express the more recent will of the Court’.  
24 See eg the case of the Rules of procedure and evidence of the International 
Criminal Court. S Fernández de Gurmendi, H Friman, ‘The Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the International Criminal Court’ (2000) 3 YB Intl Humanitarian L 289-336. 
25 See HWA Thirlway, The International Court (n 20) 73. 
26 R Higgins, Ph Webb, D Akande, S Sivakumaran, J Sloan, Oppenheim’s 
International Law (OUP 2017) 1246. 
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for their application.27 It remains, however, that the Rules are formulated 
in a way that indicates clearly the course of conduct that the parties are 
required to take. By contrast, Practice Directions are formulated as rec-
ommendations to the parties. The Court does not require a certain course 
of conduct; the Court ‘will expect the parties’ (Practice Direction I) or 
‘will find it very helpful if the parties’ behave in a certain way (Practice 
Direction VI). Correspondingly, parties are not under a duty; they ‘are 
strongly urged’ (Practice Direction III), or ‘should refrain’ from doing 
something (Practice Directions VII, VIII, IX). In the light of their con-
tent, Practice Directions may thus be regarded as a sort of soft procedural 
law.28 Here, probably, lies another explanation justifying the Court’s re-
course to this instrument. The use a ‘soft’ regulation allows the Court to 
request a certain conduct of the parties even if the Statute is silent on the 
matter or does not impose particular limitations to the parties’ freedom. 
In other words, by using a recommendatory language, the Court can 
more easily go beyond a rigid interpretation of the Statute; it can intro-
duce new solutions with the expectations that, with the passing of time, 
they would become a generally accepted practice. In the end, Practice 
Directions, with their soft content, appear to be an additional instrument 
by which the Court can enlarge its freedom of maneuver in regulating 
procedural matters. 
Is this new practice to be welcomed? The duplication of texts gov-
erning the Court’s procedure – Rules and Practice Directions – has been 
criticized because it is regarded as a possible source of confusion for 
States.29 Yet, the problem with Practice Directions lies not so much in 
the duplication of the texts as in the use of recommendatory language to 
govern procedural matters. Procedural law is an area where certainty 
about what the parties can do and what they cannot appears particularly 
important. The use of a soft regulation renders uncertain what the Court 
can really require from the parties and what the parties can regard as fall-
ing within their discretion. As many commentators have pointed out, it 
is not clear what are the consequences if a party decides not to follow the 
 
27 S Forlati, The International Court of Justice. An Arbitral Tribunal or a Judicial 
Body? (Springer 2014) 25. 
28 For this expression see A Pellet, ‘Values and Power Relations – The 
“Disillusionment” of International Law?’, KFG Working Paper Series No 34, 1, 8. 
29 S Yee, ‘Notes on the International’ (n 18) 682. 
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Court’s recommendation.30 In short, the softness of Practice Directions 
risks to generate more confusion than contribute to an orderly regulation 
of the parties’ conduct and of the whole procedure before the Court. 
 
 
3.  Enforcing respect of procedural rules: How far can the Court go in ‘pun-
ishing’ non-complying parties? 
 
 3.1.  Sanctioning disobedient parties: few instruments and a scant prac-
tice 
 
In assessing questions of compliance with the Court’s decisions, the 
main focus is generally on the post-adjudicative phase: whether the par-
ties complied with the final judgment and what means of enforcement 
are available to ensure effective compliance. By contrast, parties’ non-
compliance with procedural obligations and Court’s decisions during the 
proceedings, as well as the power of the ICJ to sanction such non-com-
pliance, are issues that have not attracted much attention so far. Different 
factors may explain this state of affairs. First, the Court’s practice does 
not offer much on the subject; as noted by Rosenne, ‘on the whole, few 
difficulties arise in practice concerning compliance with interlocutory de-
cisions’.31 This is so also because many procedural decisions of the Court, 
such as those concerning the admissibility of a certain request, do not 
require a particular conduct of the parties for their implementation: they 
are ‘self-executing, so that the question of compliance with [them] does 
not arise’.32 More fundamentally, most of the sanctions that the Court 
might impose against the non-complying party go substantially unno-
ticed. They take the form of minor procedural disadvantages that do not 
give rise to particular problems. And even in this regard, the Court is 
generally very prudent before taking the step of imposing procedural dis-
advantages. Thus, it has been noted that, while in principle pleadings 
submitted out of time should not be included in the case-file, ‘[t]here 
 
30 A Pellet, ‘Remarks on Proceedings before the International Court of Justice’, in A 
Del Vecchio (ed), New International Tribunals and New International Proceedings 
(Giuffré 2006), 99, 114; A Watts, ‘New Practice Directions of the International Court of 
Justice’ (2002) 1 L and Practice of Intl Courts and Tribunals 247, 255. 
31 Sh Rosenne, The Law and Practice (n 12) 206. 
32 HWA Thirlway, The International Court (n 20) 134 n 6. 
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seems to be no instances where delay has gone so far’.33 In sum, the 
Court’s approach towards problems of compliance with procedural ob-
ligations differs considerably from that of domestic courts. The Court 
retains a wide degree of flexibility in assessing a party’s compliance and 
the possible consequences in case of non-compliance. As an influential 
former President of the Court put it, rules of procedure ‘do not constitute 
a straitjacket, either for the Court or for the parties appearing before it’.34 
This flexibility has been generally used with extreme caution, also to 
avoid to give rise to potentially confrontational situations with the parties. 
The Statute itself does not endow the Court with particular instru-
ments for dealing with cases of non-compliance. A case in point is pro-
vided by Article 49 of the Statute. According to this provision, ‘[t]he 
Court may, even before the hearing begins, call upon the agents to pro-
duce any document or to supply any explanations. Formal note shall be 
taken of any refusal’. Taking ‘formal note’ is hardly an effective sanction. 
The Court could add teeth to this measure by drawing adverse inferences 
from a party’s refusal to produce a document. International courts, in-
cluding the Iran-US Claims Tribunal and investments tribunals, have fol-
lowed this approach. The ICJ has so far refrained from recognizing ex-
plicitly its power to draw adverse inference from the party’s refusal to 
produce the document. 35 The Court’s reluctance, in this respect, may be 
partly explained by the fact that, under Article 49, the Court does not 
appear to have the power to impose upon the parties a binding obligation 
to produce documents.36 
In principle, the Court could also rely on general principles of proce-
dural law in order to sanction the parties’ conduct, particularly when a 
party attempts to exploit the procedure to obstruct the administration of 
justice. Abuse of process – that is, ‘the use of procedural instruments or 
rights by one or more parties for purposes that are alien to those for 
 
33 ibid. Thirlway adds that ‘the Court would certainly be very reluctant to ignore a 
document actually submitted merely on the ground that it was out of time’. 
34 M Lachs, ‘The Revised Procedure of the International Court of Justice’, in F 
Kalshoven, PJ Kuijper, J G Lammers (eds), Essays on the Development of the International 
Legal Order in Memory of  H F van Panhuys (Sijthoff and Noordhoff 1980) 21, 49. 
35 See M Benzing, ‘Evidentiary Issues’, in A Zimmermann, Ch Tams (eds), The 
Statute (n 5) 1371, 1388; Ch Brown (n 2) 108-109. 
36 Ch Tams, J Devaney, ‘Article 49’, in A Zimmermann, Ch Tams (eds), The Statute 
(n 5) 1424-25. 
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which the procedural rights were invoked’37 – has been frequently in-
voked before the Court. Unlike other international tribunals, and in par-
ticular investment tribunals,38 the Court, while not excluding its power 
to sanction an abuse of procedure, has never recognized that the condi-
tions for its application were met. Its approach has been rather strict. 
Most recently, it has stated that ‘[i]t is only in exceptional circumstances 
that the Court should reject a claim based on a valid title of jurisdiction 
on the ground of abuse of process’.39 
 
3.2.  A special case: non-compliance with provisional measures 
 
Nowadays, the power of sanction of the Court is mainly discussed in 
relation to a party’s non-compliance with provisional measures.40 The im-
portance attached to this issue is a direct consequence of the Court’s ex-
plicit recognition that provisional measures have binding effects. The 
point here is not to discuss the well-foundedness of the Court’s interpre-
tation of Article 41 of the Statute. The point is that of assessing the im-
plications stemming from the fact that, in the Court’s view, the parties 
are under a legal obligation to comply with an order under Article 41. It 
is submitted that compliance with provisional measures cannot be con-
sidered as a purely ‘private’ matter that pertains exclusively to the rela-
tionship between the parties; there is also a ‘public’ or ‘public order’ di-
mension which concerns the position the parties vis-à-vis the Court.41 To 
put it otherwise, lack of compliance with provisional measures does affect 
exclusively the rights and interests of the contending parties and is not 
absorbed entirely by the interstate dynamic based on the general regime 
 
37 R Kolb (n 5) 998. 
38 See H Ascensio, ‘Abuse of Process in International Investment Arbitration’ (2014) 
13 Chinese J Intl L 763. 
39 ICJ, Immunities and criminal proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v France) (Judgment, 
6 June 2018) [2018] ICJ Rep para 150. 
40 For an early discussion of the problem see T Stein, ‘Contempt, Crisis and the 
Court: The World Court and the Hostage Rescue Attempt’ (1982) 76 AJIL, 528. 
41 On this ‘public order’ aspect see M Mendelson, ‘State Responsibility for Breach of 
Interim Protection Orders of the International Court of Justice’, in M Fitzmaurice, D 
Sarooshi (eds), Issues of State Responsibility before International Judicial Institutions (Hart 
2004) 42. For a (slightly different) distinction between rules concerning the organization 
and internal administration of the Court and rules concerning the rights of the parties, 
and for the implication of this distinction as regards the sanctions attaching to these rules, 
see The Law and Practice (n 12) 1026. 
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of responsibility for an international wrongful act. The Court itself has its 
own interest in ensuring respect for provisional measures. Failure to com-
ply with obligations laid down in provisional measures not only offends 
against the authority of the Court; it undermines the effective administra-
tion of justice in a particular case. The problem then becomes that of 
determining what the Court can and should do in order to react to a 
breach of provisional measures. 
A number of issues can be raised in this regard. A first question is 
whether the Court may determine by its own initiative – irrespective of 
the claims of the parties – whether provisional measures have been com-
plied with, possibly also in the absence of jurisdiction on the merits of 
the dispute.42 More interesting, for the present purposes, is to assess 
whether the Court, irrespective of the invocation of responsibility by the 
injured party, can impose distinct sanctions on the non-complying party. 
As already noted, the Statute offers little in terms of measures availa-
ble to the Court to sanction a non-complying party. A variety of measures 
has been suggested by commentators. Some of these measures, such as 
levying penalties or awarding punitive damages, are to be ruled out, pre-
cisely because they do not seem to have a basis in the Statute.43 Others, 
such as withholding the judgment,44 do not seem to offer an appropriate 
remedy, as they end up in diverting the Court from its primary function, 
namely, to decide the dispute in accordance with international law. 
A form of sanction that could be envisaged in response to lack of 
compliance with provisional measures is the imposition of costs, or part 
of costs, relating to the proceedings. The Statute does not rule out the 
possibility of using the award of costs as a form of sanction against the 
 
42 On this issue see P Palchetti, ‘Responsibility for Breach of Provisional Measures of 
the ICJ: Between Protection of the Rights of the Parties and Respect of the Judicial 
Function’ (2017) 100 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 5, 8. 
43 See M Mendelson (n 41) 42. However, according to O Schachter, ‘International 
Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public International Law’ (1982) 178 
Recueil des Cours 223, the Court has the authority to levy damages against the non-
complying State. See also T Stein (n 40) 527. According to R Kolb, The International 
Court of Justice (Hart 2013) 649,‘[f]rom the legal point of view, it [the Court] would even 
have the right to require reparation to be made to the Court itself’. 
44 O Schachter (n 43) 223. 
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non-complying party.45 The fact that levying costs against the non-com-
plying party benefits the other party does not deprive this measure of its 
preeminently punitive character and deterrent purpose. The imposition 
of the costs on the non-complying party has been raised before the Court 
in the joint cases Certain activities carried out by Nicaragua in the border 
area and Construction of a road in Costa Rica along the San Juan river. 
‘[T]aking into account the overall circumstances of the case’, the Court 
found that ‘an award of costs … would not be appropriate.’46 
So far, the Court has been cautious in dealing with situations of non-
compliance with provisional measures. In the Court’s case law after 
LaGrand, the ordinary remedy for breaches of provisional measures has 
taken the form of a finding of non-compliance recorded in the operative 
part of the judgment. A finding of non-compliance performs primarily a 
form of reparation, by way of satisfaction, for the injury caused to the 
other party. However, it also expresses the Court’s censure for the non-
complying conduct. In this respect, it may be regarded as a form of sanc-
tion for the harm caused to the judicial process, a sanction that – it is 
submitted –  the Court would be empowered to adopt irrespective of any 
specific request by the injured party aimed at obtaining a finding of non-
compliance. The effectiveness of this sanction should not be underesti-
mated, as it inflicts significant reputational costs on the responsible 
party.47 It remains that in certain cases this may appear an excessively 
mild response. 
 
45 Art 64 simply provides that that the general rule, according to which each party 
shall bear its own costs, is to be applied ‘[u]nless otherwise decided by’. In the past, the 
possibility of using the apportionement of costs as a form of sanction was advocated by 
G Barile, ‘Osservazioni sulla indicazione di misure cautelari nei procedimenti davanti alla 
Corte internazionale di giustizia’ (1952) 4 Comunicazioni e Studi 154. 
46 [2015] ICJ Rep 718. In a joint declaration, four judges held the view that the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ of the case warranted the exercise by the Court of its power 
under art 64 of the Statute. In particular, they emphasized that the costs incurred by Costa 
Rica ‘were a direct consequence of Nicaragua’s breach of the obligations imposed by the 
2011 Order’. Joint declaration of Judges Tomka, Greenwood, Sebutinde and Judge ad 
hoc Dugard, para 7. 
47 See T Stein (n 40) 524, who maintained that ‘[i]n a context where rectitude is the 
primary value at stake, censure by the Court is a significant sanction’. Contra G Zyberi, 
‘Provisional Measures of the International Court of Justice in Armed Conflict Situations’ 
(2010) 23 Leiden J Intl L 581, who maintained that a finding of non-compliance ‘does 
not seem to address properly the damage caused to the Court’s own standing by a lack of 
compliance with its provisional measures orders’. 
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4.  Conclusions 
 
This article started by recognizing the freedom enjoyed by the ICJ in 
procedural matters. It may now be appropriate, in order also to rebalance 
a bit the picture, to conclude this article on a different note, focusing 
instead on the factors which limit the freedom of action of the Court. 
Unsurprisingly, the first factor to be mentioned is the Court’s lack of 
compulsory jurisdiction. True, the willingness, or lack of willingness, of 
States to have recourse to the Court for the settlement of their disputes 
depends on a plurality of reasons and the procedure before the Court is 
not necessarily among the most important ones. Yet, it remains a relevant 
factor and the Court appears to be aware of it: several changes in the 
Rules – starting from the 1972 revision of the rules concerning the use of 
ad hoc chambers – were made with the aim of tempting more States to 
use the ICJ. In this respect, while States have in practice little possibility 
to directly interfere with the Court’s rule-making activity, they can exer-
cise a form of indirect check on it. The Court remains accountable to 
States insofar as it has necessarily to take into account their possible re-
actions to a change in the procedure. Lack of compulsory jurisdiction 
stands therefore as a deterrent against the possibility of a ‘too creative’ 
exercise by the Court of its rule-making power. The point, then, is 
whether the relevance inevitably attached to the States’ viewpoint should 
not encourage the Court to introduce some changes in its internal proce-
dure for the revision of its Rules. Among the possible change, greater 
transparency, particularly through the publication of the records of the 
preparatory works, would help States to have a better understanding of 
the reasons and implications of the revision, as well as of its conformity 
with the statute. Whether States should be directly involved in the pro-
cedure for revision, and what form that involvement should take, is a 
more problematic issue that has no straightforward answer. 
Another factor to be taken into account is related to the Court’s cli-
entele. The Court settle disputes between States. The fact of dealing with 
States has an impact on the Court’s approach to certain procedural is-
sues. This becomes particularly evident when assessing the Court’s power 
of sanction and helps to explain why this continues to be a largely under-
developed area in the procedure before the Court. In an environment 
where the litigating parties are States and where judgments are not 
backed by an effective mechanism for enforcement, creating a climate 
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conducive to a smooth and mutually acceptable settlement of the dispute 
and minimizing the risk of confrontational situations are traditionally re-
garded as important priorities. While the Court may partly have moved 
away from ‘the culture of excessive deference to State sovereignty in a 
range of procedural issue’,48 its approach to the problem of sanctioning 
lack of compliance with procedural rules still appears to be influenced by 
such considerations. This obviously does not mean that States are given 
an indiscriminate freedom of action. The consequence of this state of af-
fair is rather that, in enforcing respect of procedural rules, the Court’s 
main worry appears to be that of preventing parties from obtaining any 
improper advantage within the process rather than that of vindicating its 
own authority. The focus is on the settlement of the dispute between the 
parties, and not in the ‘punishment’ of the disobedient party. As its gen-
eral practice, and particularly that concerning lack of compliance with 
provisional measures, appears to show, the Court has been very cautious 
about claiming respect for its judicial authority as such. This aspect is 
probably destined to remain a distinctive feature of the Court’s judicial 
activity, being more in keeping with its function as an instrument for se-
curing the settlement of dispute between States. 
  
 
48 R Higgins, ‘Respecting Sovereign States and Running a Tight Courtroom’ (2001) 
50 ICLQ 121, 131. 
